Explore how Sudan displacement has transformed politics, capital, and identity. This in‑depth analysis reveals why return does not end displacement—it reenacts it.
Introduction: When Displacement Becomes Permanent
The crisis of Sudan displacement has reached an unprecedented scale—more than any previous upheaval in the nation’s history. What was once framed as temporary emergency is now being understood as a structural, political transformation that rewrites the nature of power, capital, and identity in Sudan. This article examines how displacement, war, and the collapse of economic infrastructure have given rise to a new form of politics—one where return does not restore, but rather reveals a fundamentally changed landscape.
1. A Displaced Capital: The Rise and Fall of Khartoum
At the heart of this crisis is Khartoum. Once on track to become one of Africa’s great megacities, it is now the epicenter of displacement. More than 30% of internally displaced persons (IDPs) came from the capital, which had symbolized rapid urbanization tied to Sudan’s elite-driven political economy. As the conflict stretches toward two years, some IDPs have begun returning—but the city they knew is irreversibly altered.
According to recent figures, the International Organization for Migration reported a small decline (2.4%) in internally displaced persons as of March 2025—the first drop since April 2023. While some area reclaimed by the Sudan Armed Forces is drawing returnees, their reintegration confronts a devastated city missing the public services, livelihoods, and political structures that once defined life in Khartoum.
2. Linking Stories, Sharing Trauma: Sudanese Voices in Exile
Many Sudanese researchers and activists are themselves displaced, offering a unique perspective on how Sudan displacement intersects with identity, capital, and the promise of return. Their work, produced through collaborations like the Center for Economic, Legal, and Social Studies and Documentation (CEDEJ‑Khartoum) and Sudan‑Norway Academic Cooperation (SNAC), challenges assumptions about displacement as an interruption—instead positing it as a persistent condition of political life.
These testimonies are part of a broader conversation led by African scholars, featured on platforms such as African Arguments, which provide firsthand insight into how displacement shapes both individual and collective futures. One such contributor writes about the endurance of political agency abroad and the fractures in governance left behind. This project not only explores the systemic drivers of displacement—it also offers a narrative that centers those most affected, lending urgency to the debate and reframing return as a transformative moment rather than a resolution. Find more through a feature‑length exploration linked here: [African Arguments on Sudan displacement].
3. Beyond Return: Displacement as Political Transformation
For those who go back, return does not signal the end of displacement. Instead, it marks a shift in political reality. Homes lie in ruins. Institutions have collapsed. Networks of patronage and protection have evaporated. Displaced returnees reenter a landscape where old systems no longer operate—and where new, hybrid systems of governance have taken root.
In effect, displacement has become permanent. Political actors can no longer rely on familiar economic capital or state institutions. Instead, survival and influence depend on adaptability: access to remittance networks, diaspora ties, foreign currencies, and global advocacy platforms.
4. The Collapse of Economic Capital: Infrastructure, Industry, and Agriculture
The war since 2023 has devastated Sudan’s economic foundations. Factories and farms have been destroyed, communication and transport networks have collapsed, and public services are either nonfunctional or co‑opted by non‑state actors.
- Manufacturing: Over 90% of manufacturing facilities in Khartoum reportedly lie in rubble, wiping out decades of industrial expansion.
- Services: Once dominated by trade, hospitality, financial services, this sector has all but vanished in urban war zones.
- Agriculture: Despite being Sudan’s largest employer, farming has suffered from insecurity, broken supply chains, and skyrocketing input costs—forcing many rural workers into informal, precarious livelihoods.
This collapse has completely disrupted the mechanisms by which elite political capital was generated and maintained, revealing the fragility of a system built on extractive economic exchange and transactional alliances.
5. Gold, Extractive Survival, and the Militarized Political Marketplace
With tax revenue collapsing (it was just 2.1% of GDP in 2022), the Sudanese state has become increasingly reliant on gold exports—both formal and illicit—to finance operations. In the past two years, gold production reportedly brought in around $1.9 billion, overshadowing income from formal economic activities.
This shift has entrenched a political marketplace dominated by military elites. The scramble for revenues from gold mines, customs, and smuggling has turned governance into a transactional system—where loyalty is purchased in exchange for access to resources. This is not new; it is simply now more visible and intense.
6. Fragmented Governance: Non‑State Actors and Hyper‑Local Authority
As state structures fail, community governance has fractured into a patchwork landscape:
- Armed groups may provide electricity via generator schemes.
- Diaspora-backed NGOs or Gulf-funded charities deliver water or healthcare.
- Tribal councils or local mutual aid groups mediate conflict and disputes.
Public authority no longer depends on legitimacy or formal institutions—it depends on who delivers services, where, and how reliably. Compliance by communities is transactional; allegiance is fluid. Governance becomes a performance of authority, reproduced through coercion, patronage, and necessity.
7. The Middle Class—Outsourced Security, Fragmented Agency
Sudan’s urban middle class was historically buffered by remittances from expatriate relatives. Now, that same lifeline fills the void left by a state that no longer provides healthcare, education, or basic services. Middle-income households often rely on diaspora‑funded private services—hiring security guards, purchasing medicines, or paying for passports and travel documents.
While these measures temporarily sustain households, they further erode collective political agency. The middle class becomes atomized, reliant on individualized strategies of survival rather than group mobilization or political solidarity.
8. Capital in Motion: Transferable vs. Non‑Transferable Resources
A critical shift in political agency emerges from how capital is now judged in displacement contexts:
- Non‑Transferable Capital: Assets embedded in pre‑war structures—land titles, patronage networks, bureaucratic prestige—entertain zero value once those systems collapse.
- Transferable Capital: Skills, languages, remittance connections, diaspora advocacy, cross-border networks—these remain potent resources. They shape new forms of influence that work across contexts, rather than within a defunct system.
Political influence now depends on what individuals and networks can carry with them, and how effectively they can adapt to exile and reintegration scenarios.
9. Displacement as a Catalyst for New Political Forms
With traditional political institutions decimated, new actors and structures are emerging:
- Exiled activists using digital platforms to influence international opinion.
- Transnational diaspora coalitions advocating for justice, representation, and reconstruction.
- Local leaders blending customary authority with NGO funding to govern neighbourhoods.
These emerging forms of political agency are shaped not by historical hierarchies, but by survival, innovation, and strategic flexibility. Displaced individuals no longer aspire to reclaim old positions—they build new ones based on global capacities and local needs.
10. Rebuilding Sudan: Why Post‑War Policy Must Acknowledge Displacement Politics
Any effort to rebuild Sudan must begin by recognizing: displacement is not a temporary interruption—it is the defining condition of post‑war society. The transformation of political agency and capital during displacement has produced actors whose legitimacy and authority lie outside the pre‑2023 framework.
Ignoring this reality undermines efforts to rebuild:
- Infrastructure projects without inclusive governance models will fail.
- State‑centrism cannot reassert authority simply by rebuilding ministries.
- Refugees and returnees expect representation in rebuilding institutions shaped by their lived political realities.
A new roadmap must:
- Center transferable capital: support diaspora‑based initiatives, recognize trans-border networks.
- Integrate local governance structures: official policy must acknowledge the role of NGOs, tribal leaders, neighbourhood councils.
- Design economic recovery that rebuilds not just infrastructure, but channels of livelihood and agency.
Conclusion: Sudan Displacement as the New Politics
The crisis of Sudan displacement is not a temporary humanitarian disaster—it is a structural transformation of power, capital, and community. Return does not undo displacement; it reveals a new configuration of authority, resources, and political life.
As Sudan enters the long phase of recovery, political thinkers, policymakers, and international allies must rethink assumptions: the future Sudan will not mirror the old order. Instead, it will be shaped by actors forged in displacement—who navigate survival, craft new alliances, and redefine legitimacy beyond destroyed institutions.
Understanding displacement as a permanent political reality is essential. Rebuilding Sudan is not about restoring the past—it’s about engaging and empowering the individuals and networks who lived through displacement and are now rebuilding their nation from its ground up.
